The Citizen Lab

自Zoom報告發佈以來，我們收到了許多疑問。就常見疑問，我們發佈了一篇後續報告，補充說明 Zoom 存在的安全漏洞，並回應外界對我們研究的錯誤解讀。t.co/NL3hIsZZya

Anatomy of a Zoom call t.co/jp3ReVxVI5

In our latest research brief, we describe a security issue where users in the “waiting room” of a Zoom meeting could have spied on the meeting, even if they were not approved to join. Zoom fixed the issue after we reported it to them. t.co/35GgSBFvxA

Join @jsrailton this Thursday for a conversation on COVID-19 and increasing calls for the deployment of spyware in the name of public good t.co/xT8XSR8Gft

A newly published paper by @abulkhaezuran and @AndrewMLeber showcase the usefulness of social media data for political analysis by focusing on the main Arabic Twitter hashtag following the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi. t.co/2RuRGSmzx1

Trust is critical during a pandemic. But trust is difficult to earn when governments suggest deploying invasive technologies that are perceived as pretexts for dismantling privacy. @jsrailton on why spyware will not be our savior. t.co/OrBVWqT4xl

“I would think very carefully before I used Zoom to communicate classified information, trade secrets, or confidential medical data." - @billmarczak t.co/phfQbBGx7v

NEW REPORT: Move Fast & Roll Your Own Crypto: A Quick Look at the Confidentiality of Zoom Meetings t.co/WFgWSI9qqH

Thread 👇

"I can't think of a better brand name to make citizens nervous about a governmental tracking effort," says @jsrailton of NSO's new COVID-19 software. t.co/iyVv2qISRM

ICYMI t.co/CjI9mKAYDh

“In this moment of crisis, phone companies, regulators and the Department of Justice should step up to prevent foreign powers from tracking us through our phones."- @jsrailton t.co/3w8fK2SQTS

"Most services and technologies of this nature haven’t been tested at this scale," says @caparsons of lawful interception systems applied at the national level. t.co/acxjVyW2sU

According to @lotus_ruan, Chinese domestic censorship is decentralized and fragmented—not monolithic—with the burden of information control downloaded to private companies. t.co/CjI9mKAYDh

Researcher @caparsons says there are limitations in scaling Canada-wide mass cellphone surveillance, to say nothing of the "wonderful problems" that could crop up if the government compels telcos to hand over this data. t.co/acxjVyW2sU

The Tibetan diaspora are no strangers to digital attacks, so they've become savvy to signs of suspicious emails, attachments, & phishing. But new exploits, like mobile threats, require new tactics. And groups like @tibcert are instrumental in this work. t.co/MspfkrGT6C

“It is one thing to censor critical or even neutral online discussions...It is another to entirely change the narrative of the crisis and attempt to turn it into a paean.” - @lotus_ruan t.co/TFk5s09a1m

"The proliferation of hacking technologies has led to a spike in reports of their use across the globe, from Mexico to Ethiopia to Tibet, and they have proved to be especially popular in the Middle East." t.co/9U8f5Tkj0G

Despite increasing knowledge of tech-enabled abuse, the legality of the creation, sale & use of consumer spyware has not been closely reviewed by Canadian courts. We find that parties throughout the stalkerware ecosystem could violate many Canadian laws. t.co/Ecq8R0KPCE

Want to discuss 习近平+疫情蔓延 (Xi Jinping + Epidemic spread)? You'll have to take that convo off WeChat, then. t.co/HykmHrOo7R

Whether client-side or server-side, keywords related to coronavirus have been censored for Chinese users on popular social media apps for months, potentially limiting their ability to access essential health and safety information. t.co/HykmHrOo7R t.co/JuBz5i9J6z

t.co/7PtvkMueek “What is interesting...about this case is that this event is more of a public-health issue rather than just a party congress or political events that do not affect a wider range of people"- @lotus_ruan

NEW REPORT: Censored Contagion: How Information on the Coronavirus is Managed on Chinese Social Media t.co/HykmHrOo7R