The Citizen Lab

"I can't think of a better brand name to make citizens nervous about a governmental tracking effort," says @jsrailton of NSO's new COVID-19 software. t.co/iyVv2qISRM

ICYMI t.co/CjI9mKAYDh

“In this moment of crisis, phone companies, regulators and the Department of Justice should step up to prevent foreign powers from tracking us through our phones."- @jsrailton t.co/3w8fK2SQTS

"Most services and technologies of this nature haven’t been tested at this scale," says @caparsons of lawful interception systems applied at the national level. t.co/acxjVyW2sU

According to @lotus_ruan, Chinese domestic censorship is decentralized and fragmented—not monolithic—with the burden of information control downloaded to private companies. t.co/CjI9mKAYDh

Researcher @caparsons says there are limitations in scaling Canada-wide mass cellphone surveillance, to say nothing of the "wonderful problems" that could crop up if the government compels telcos to hand over this data. t.co/acxjVyW2sU

The Tibetan diaspora are no strangers to digital attacks, so they've become savvy to signs of suspicious emails, attachments, & phishing. But new exploits, like mobile threats, require new tactics. And groups like @tibcert are instrumental in this work. t.co/MspfkrGT6C

“It is one thing to censor critical or even neutral online discussions...It is another to entirely change the narrative of the crisis and attempt to turn it into a paean.” - @lotus_ruan t.co/TFk5s09a1m

"The proliferation of hacking technologies has led to a spike in reports of their use across the globe, from Mexico to Ethiopia to Tibet, and they have proved to be especially popular in the Middle East." t.co/9U8f5Tkj0G

Despite increasing knowledge of tech-enabled abuse, the legality of the creation, sale & use of consumer spyware has not been closely reviewed by Canadian courts. We find that parties throughout the stalkerware ecosystem could violate many Canadian laws. t.co/Ecq8R0KPCE

Want to discuss 习近平+疫情蔓延 (Xi Jinping + Epidemic spread)? You'll have to take that convo off WeChat, then. t.co/HykmHrOo7R

Whether client-side or server-side, keywords related to coronavirus have been censored for Chinese users on popular social media apps for months, potentially limiting their ability to access essential health and safety information. t.co/HykmHrOo7R t.co/JuBz5i9J6z

t.co/7PtvkMueek “What is interesting...about this case is that this event is more of a public-health issue rather than just a party congress or political events that do not affect a wider range of people"- @lotus_ruan

NEW REPORT: Censored Contagion: How Information on the Coronavirus is Managed on Chinese Social Media t.co/HykmHrOo7R

The latest from @CensoredPlanet describes their investigation into the global proliferation of content filtering technologies (i.e., censorship) using FilterMap, a novel framework that can scalably monitor content filtering technologies worldwide. t.co/kz7BJXhCnm t.co/jra8W3A803

“These abuses were taking place...even as NSO had told the world that it was under new management and that abuses were a thing of the past."- @jsrailton t.co/0buqToJppj

To help keep track of the legal + spyware battles playing out around the world, we've created a resource documenting litigation and other formal complaints concerning digital surveillance and the digital surveillance industry. t.co/cqVYqqzD9T

“I definitely think that it is throwing down the gauntlet to the government of Canada"- @caparsons t.co/V6wPofoDXj

After initially denying it, the Toronto Police Service admits some officers have been using Clearview AI. t.co/o9uOKz7Wuv

“The problem with non-transparent/silent censorship is that you never know your messages are censored unless you check with the receivers, which is something that we as users do not usually do”- @lotus_ruan t.co/idtqy1HM5k

Instead of hosting surveillance companies & supporting the spyware industry @RonDeibert says "...governments that purport to uphold the rule of law and human rights–like the United Kingdom–should be taking immediate legal & policy measures…to rein it in.” t.co/u4HNmscHTF

ICYMI t.co/2ZBTOcEQv1

Interested in tracking LGBTQ2+ censorship around the world? Step 1: Install the @OpenObservatory Probe mobile app Step 2: Run the LGBT test: t.co/KRVTritn7Q Step 3: Contribute to our understanding of how at-risk groups are subject to information controls t.co/TJZSOeyW4A

ICYMI @caparsons discusses the potential US backlash if Huawei is used in Canada: "Canada is a net importer of intelligence. So the risk is: if we do acquire Huawei equipment...we may lose a huge trough of information that we rely on to protect ourselves." t.co/dXdwXR6PbK