The Citizen Lab

Researcher @caparsons says there are limitations in scaling Canada-wide mass cellphone surveillance, to say nothing of the "wonderful problems" that could crop up if the government compels telcos to hand over this data. t.co/acxjVyW2sU

The Tibetan diaspora are no strangers to digital attacks, so they've become savvy to signs of suspicious emails, attachments, & phishing. But new exploits, like mobile threats, require new tactics. And groups like @tibcert are instrumental in this work. t.co/MspfkrGT6C

“It is one thing to censor critical or even neutral online discussions...It is another to entirely change the narrative of the crisis and attempt to turn it into a paean.” - @lotus_ruan t.co/TFk5s09a1m

"The proliferation of hacking technologies has led to a spike in reports of their use across the globe, from Mexico to Ethiopia to Tibet, and they have proved to be especially popular in the Middle East." t.co/9U8f5Tkj0G

Despite increasing knowledge of tech-enabled abuse, the legality of the creation, sale & use of consumer spyware has not been closely reviewed by Canadian courts. We find that parties throughout the stalkerware ecosystem could violate many Canadian laws. t.co/Ecq8R0KPCE

Want to discuss 习近平+疫情蔓延 (Xi Jinping + Epidemic spread)? You'll have to take that convo off WeChat, then. t.co/HykmHrOo7R

Whether client-side or server-side, keywords related to coronavirus have been censored for Chinese users on popular social media apps for months, potentially limiting their ability to access essential health and safety information. t.co/HykmHrOo7R t.co/JuBz5i9J6z

t.co/7PtvkMueek “What is interesting...about this case is that this event is more of a public-health issue rather than just a party congress or political events that do not affect a wider range of people"- @lotus_ruan

NEW REPORT: Censored Contagion: How Information on the Coronavirus is Managed on Chinese Social Media t.co/HykmHrOo7R

The latest from @CensoredPlanet describes their investigation into the global proliferation of content filtering technologies (i.e., censorship) using FilterMap, a novel framework that can scalably monitor content filtering technologies worldwide. t.co/kz7BJXhCnm t.co/jra8W3A803

“These abuses were taking place...even as NSO had told the world that it was under new management and that abuses were a thing of the past."- @jsrailton t.co/0buqToJppj

To help keep track of the legal + spyware battles playing out around the world, we've created a resource documenting litigation and other formal complaints concerning digital surveillance and the digital surveillance industry. t.co/cqVYqqzD9T

“I definitely think that it is throwing down the gauntlet to the government of Canada"- @caparsons t.co/V6wPofoDXj

After initially denying it, the Toronto Police Service admits some officers have been using Clearview AI. t.co/o9uOKz7Wuv

“The problem with non-transparent/silent censorship is that you never know your messages are censored unless you check with the receivers, which is something that we as users do not usually do”- @lotus_ruan t.co/idtqy1HM5k

Instead of hosting surveillance companies & supporting the spyware industry @RonDeibert says "...governments that purport to uphold the rule of law and human rights–like the United Kingdom–should be taking immediate legal & policy measures…to rein it in.” t.co/u4HNmscHTF

ICYMI t.co/2ZBTOcEQv1

Interested in tracking LGBTQ2+ censorship around the world? Step 1: Install the @OpenObservatory Probe mobile app Step 2: Run the LGBT test: t.co/KRVTritn7Q Step 3: Contribute to our understanding of how at-risk groups are subject to information controls t.co/TJZSOeyW4A

ICYMI @caparsons discusses the potential US backlash if Huawei is used in Canada: "Canada is a net importer of intelligence. So the risk is: if we do acquire Huawei equipment...we may lose a huge trough of information that we rely on to protect ourselves." t.co/dXdwXR6PbK

“We are interested in getting to the truth.” - @billmarczak t.co/oH2a7F2YBX

While ostensibly sold to thwart terrorism, commercial spyware is habitually abused and used to target journalists. “What we have found is that companies either are unwilling or unable to control how their government clients use it.”- @RonDeibert t.co/FXGEa52JnH

Someone Tried to Hack My Phone. Technology Researchers Accused Saudi Arabia. t.co/fMA8kWvfZo

NEW REPORT: "Stopping the Press: @nytimes Journalist @NYTBen Targeted by Saudi-linked Pegasus Spyware Operator" by @citizenlab: t.co/v2nnqKesdf

Interested in developing your own data access request initiative? The Access My Info Playbook walks through all the requirements for setting up an AMI project including detailed descriptions of research methods and communications strategies. t.co/T3Oe3mSidp t.co/4Hdt4EUF9m

In China, you can name your gaming avatar many things—but not Xi Jinping. Analyzing 200 games and over 180,000 blacklisted keywords, Citizen Lab researchers explain the role of companies and government authorities in the implementation of censorship. #TBT t.co/vWpqLnBA1L